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Traditional U.S. industries with higher firm-specific stock return and fundamentals performance heterogeneity
use information technology (IT) more intensively and post faster productivity growth in the late 20th
century. We argue that elevated firm performance heterogeneity mechanically reflects a wave of Schumpeter's
(1912) creative destruction disrupting a wide swath of U.S. industries, with newly successful IT adopters
unpredictably undermining established firms. This evidence validates endogenous growth theory models
of creative destruction, such as Aghion and Howitt (1992); and suggests that recent findings of more
elevated firm-specific performance variation in richer, faster growing countries with more transparent
accounting, better financial systems, and more secure property rights might partly reflect more intensive
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A wave of innovation across a broad range of technologies, combined with considerable 
deregulation and a further lowering of barriers to trade, fostered a pronounced expansion of 
competition and creative destruction. The result through the 1990s of all this seeming-
heightened instability for individual businesses, somewhat surprisingly, was an apparent 
reduction in the volatility of output and in the frequency and amplitude of business cycles for the 
macroeconomy. 
Alan Greenspan, Speech on Economic Volatility, 2002. 
 
1. Introduction 
Elevated heterogeneity in firm-specific stock return and fundamentals performance is significantly 
correlated with more intensive use of information technology (IT) and faster productivity growth across a 
panel of traditional U.S. industries from 1971 to 2000. We argue that this suggests IT, at least in the early 
decades of its absorption into the economy in the late 20
th century, induced a tremor of Schumpeter’s 
(1912) creative destruction across a wide swath of U.S. industries. New innovators, with abnormally 
good performance, unpredictably and continually rose to dislodge established firms, abnormally 
depressing their performance. This suggests intensified creative destruction as a new explanation for the 
rising firm performance heterogeneity observed among publicly traded firms in recent decades in the U.S. 
and other developed economies by Morck et al. (2000), Campbell et al. (2001), Irvine and Pontiff (2004), 
Wei and Zhang (2006), and others.  
We study publicly trade firms in traditional U.S. manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries 
– like lumber and wood products, retail trade, and motion pictures – first because this avoids possible 
noise in dot.com stock returns; but more importantly because Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995), 
Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998), Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005), and others argue that IT is a general 
purpose technology (GPT) which, like electrification in the early 20
th century or steam power early in the 
industrial revolution, induces process and product innovation across most industries. Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg (1995) and Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998) model GPTs driving economic growth, and cite 
IT as an example. Oliner and Sichel (2000), Jorgenson (2001), Stiroh (2002), and Brynjolfsson and Hitt 
(2003) also link IT to economy-wide enhanced productivity.  
Our findings thus buttress approaches to economic growth theory, such as Pastor and Veronesi   2
(2005), which models an economy absorbing a new technology and consequently exhibiting sustained 
elevated firm performance heterogeneity; and, more generally, Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998), Aghion 
et al. (2004, 2005), Acemoglu et al. (2005, 2006), and other formalizations of Schumpeter’s (1912) 
concept of creative destruction.  
Other research into rising firm-specific performance variation can readily be reinterpreted in light 
of our findings. Pastor and Veronesi (2003), Fama and French (2004), Bennett and Sias (2005), Brown 
and Kapadia (2005), and Fink et al. (2005) link heterogeneity to small or young firms. Philippon (2003), 
Gaspar and Massa (2004), and Irvine and Pontiff (2004) stress intensified competition and deregulation. 
Morck et al. (2000), Fox et al. (2003), Bris et al. (2004), Durnev et al. (2004a), Huang (2004), Ozoguz 
(2004), Biddle and Hilary (2006), Jin and Myers (2006), link elevated firm performance heterogeneity to 
financial system development and transparency. Neatly tying all these findings together, Schumpeter 
(1912) links creative destruction to intensified competition from new, initially small, upstart firms that 
need external financing to grow rapidly,
1 Murphy  et al. (1991) model regulation repressing creative 
destruction; and Schumpeter’s (1939) theory of business cycles posits that intensified competition trails 
waves of creative destruction. The link we find between IT and elevated firm performance heterogeneity 
nonetheless survives controls for all these factors, and for other relevant industry characteristics, 
suggesting a robust overarching role for IT.  
Our results thus comfort financial economists, like Roll (1988), who lament the low R
2 statistics 
of standard asset pricing models caused by high firm-specific stock return variation in the U.S. and other 
developed countries. If this reflects faster creative destruction in countries with better institutions, there is 
no cause for lamentation. Asset pricing models not only retain their basic validity, but may also find a 
new following among growth theorists as gauges of the intensity of creative destruction and related 
phenomena. Creative destruction is usually envisioned as creative innovators destroying laggards utterly; 
however the laggards, in practice, may only be beaten back for a while. Firm-specific performance 
                                                 
1 King and Levine (1993) provide empirical validation for the dependence of these firms on external financing. Fogel et al. 
(2005) empirically link creative destruction to countries’ financial development.   3
heterogeneity may thus be a finer and more nuanced metric of the intensity of creative destruction than 
firm exit rates.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our IT intensity, firm performance 
heterogeneity, and TFP measures. Section 3 covers regressions and Section 4 discusses interpretation and 
statistical robustness issues. Section 5 concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of our results.  
 
2. Variables  Construction 
This section describes our main variables and the data used to construct them. Our results are robust to 
various alternative constructions, described in detail in section 4.  
 
2.1  Information Technology Intensity 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth (FRTW) data track investment 
in 61 asset classes from 1971 to 2000, by two-digit industry.
2 Because we are interested in IT as a GPT in 
traditional sectors, we drop industries whose primary products are IT goods or services: industrial 
machinery (SIC 35), which includes computer manufacturing, and business services (SIC 73), which 
includes computer related services and software. We also drop five financial industries (SIC codes in the 
60s), whose accounting data are incomparable, and five agriculture and mining industries, whose IT 
investment is missing for part of the sample period. This leaves a 1,290 industry-year panel of IT 
investment spanning 30 years and 43 industries, 19 in manufacturing.  
  Stiroh (2002) and Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) link IT to total factor productivity (TFP) growth 
after the late 1980s, but Loveman (1994) and Stiroh (1998) find no link in earlier periods. Helpman and 
Trajtenberg (1998) explain this so-called IT productivity paradox – scant evidence of an IT impact on 
TFP in early studies – by showing that gains in productivity growth appear only after IT use intensifies. In 
this spirit, we use each industry’s IT capital stock, not its IT investment rate, to capture creative   4
destruction.  
  We convert flows into stocks with perpetual inventory models (Hall, 1990). Thus, industry i’s 
stock of asset k at time t is  
[1]  Ki,k,t = (1 – δk)Ki,k,t - 1 + Ii,k,t, 
with δk an asset-specific depreciation rate and Ii,k,t the industry’s spending on type k assets that year. We 
set δk for IT to 0.31, as in the BEA FRTW data – see Fraumeni (1997).  
  We define IT capital as seven classes of computer hardware (mainframe computers, personal 
computers, direct access storage devices, computer printers, computer terminals, computer tape drives, 
and computer storage devices) and three classes of software (pre-packaged, custom, and own-account 
software).  
















We aggregate heterogeneous assets in [2] using Törnqvist indexes, as recommended by Jorgenson and 
Griliches (1967).  
 
2.2  Firm Performance Heterogeneity 
We now describe our firm performance metrics: real sales growth and stock returns. The quarterly real 
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where  τ , ,i j S is nominal net sales by firm j  (Compustat quarterly item 2) during quarter τ. Firm j is 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 Herman (2000) describes FRTW. Our industries resemble Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001) and Stiroh (2002). Fama and French 
(1997) partition manufacturing more finely and non-manufacturing more coarsely, with 28 and 20 categories, respectively.    5
assigned to industry i based on Compustat industry codes. The price deflator Pi,τ is a BEA Gross Product 
Originating (GPO) two-digit industry gross output price index from 1977 on; or a Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) Multifactor Productivity Measures’ gross output prices index for earlier years when GPO 
data are unavailable. We drop observations with Compustat footnotes, which flag unusual events – like 
mergers, accounting changes, and discontinued operations – that can render sales growth estimates 
problematic.  
 Firm  j’s stock return during month τ is rj,i,τ, its monthly total return from CRSP, which includes 
dividends and is adjusted for stock dividends, splits, and reverse splits.  
  To gauge the heterogeneity of each firm performance metrics in each industry, we remove 
common effects shared by all firms in an industry or the economy. To do this, we follow Roll (1988) in 
distinguishing  firm-specific variation from the sum of market- and industry-related variations. For 
simplicity, we call the latter sum systematic variation. To obtain this decomposition, we follow Durnev et 
al. (2004b) and regress  
[4]  τ τ τ τ ε β β α , , , , , , , , , , , i j i
i
t i j m
m
t i j t j i j r r r + + + = , 
with τ indexing the twelve monthly returns in year t. The value-weighted market and industry returns, rm,τ 
and ri,τ, exclude firm j to prevent spurious correlations with industry performance in industries with few 
firms.  
  Sales growth regressions are identical to [4], but τ indexes quarterly performance over the twelve 
quarters up to and including those in year t. The analogs in these to rm,τ and ri,τ are sales-weighted market 
and industry-level sales growth rates.  
The sum of squared residuals, SSEj,i,t, and model variation, SSMj,i,t, from running [4] on the nj,t 
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of industry i for year t. Except in the robustness tests in section 4.2.1, nj,t = 12 for all firms. Firms with 
missing data are dropped. We require at least 5 firms in an industry.  
An analog to the R
2 of [4] measures mean systematic over total variation, 
22















Since  IT intensity data exist for t  ∈ [1971, 2000], intersecting these data with those for IT 
intensity yield panels of 1,180 industry-years for stock return heterogeneity regressions on IT intensity 
and 1,010 for sales growth heterogeneity regressions. This final sample spans 41 industries, as we drop 
four (local and interurban passenger transit, pipelines except natural gas, miscellaneous repair services, 
and legal services) because of insufficient data to estimate firm-specific variation.  
 
2.3  Total Factor Productivity 
Schumpeter (1912) argues that creative destruction enhances economic efficiency, which we capture 
using total factor productivity (TFP) growth. We measures industry TFP growth in two ways.  The first is 
TFP growth constructed from industry-level BEA data; the second is constructed to reflect the 
productivity of our sample of firms. The BEA’s TFP figures better reflect overall productivity growth in 
the industry, for they are based on government data covering all firms in the industry, including small and 
unlisted firms that do not appear in our sample.  However, Davis et al. (2006) report markedly different 
patterns of firm-level volatility in listed and unlisted firms.  We therefore construct a second measure of 
TFP growth based on accounting data reported by the sample of listed firms used in constructing our 
other variables.  The BEA measure is thus a more complete reflection of overall industry productivity,   7
while our TFP growth estimate is a more precise reflection of the productivity of the firms used to 
construct our other variables.   
We estimate each industry’s total factor productivity (TFP) as value-added less labor and capital 
costs. Industry TFP growth is the change in log industry TFP levels. We use annual, rather than quarterly 
data, because the estimation technique requires data only disclosed annually.  BEA industry-level TFP 
measures are calculated using value-added, labor cost, and labor force variables from BEA’s GPO data 
and capital related variables from the BEA’s FRTW data. Compustat based industry TFP measures are 
weighted averages of firm-level TFPs defined as   
[8]  ,, , , , , , , , , , , , , , ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) it jit jit L jit jit K jit jit ji TFP Y L K μγ γ
∈ ⎡⎤ ≡− − ⎣⎦ ∑ , 
where Yj,i,t is the real value-added by firm j in industry i, γL,j,i,t and γK,j,i,t are the firm’s labor and capital 
cost shares, and Lj,i,t and Kj,i,t are its labor force and capital. The weight μj,i,t is firm j’s nominal value-
added (Vj,i,t) over total industry nominal value-added in year t,  ,, ,. jit jit ji VV
∈ ∑ . 
  Value-added, Vj,i,t, is operating income before depreciation (Compustat item 13) plus labor and 
related expenses (item 42) as in Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003). To obtain real value-added, nominal value-
added is deflated by industry i’s two-digit GPO value-added deflator. Prior to 1977, these deflators are 
unavailable, so we use gross output and intermediate input prices from BLS Multifactor Productivity data 
to construct our own. If labor and related expenses are unreported, we estimate them as industry average 
wage, from GPO data, times the firm’s workforce (item 29). If employees’ benefits are excluded from 
labor and related expenses (Compustat footnote 22), we estimate them as the industry average ratio of 
benefits to total compensation using GPO data.  
  Labor force, Lj,i,t, is employees (item 29) and labor cost share, γL,j,i,t , is the average in years t and 
t-1 of labor and related expenses (item 42 or the estimate described above) divided by this plus capital 
services costs.  
Capital services costs are capital assets, defined below, times industry annual rental price of   8
capital. As in Hall and Jorgenson (1967) and BLS (1997), the rental price of capital for asset k in industry 
i at time t is  
[9]  ()
,,















with ζk,t the effective rate of investment tax credit, ut the corporate income tax rate, zk,t the present value 
of capital consumption allowances, ri,t the nominal internal rate of return, δk the depreciation rate, Gk,t 
the asset-specific capital gain, and qk,t an investment deflator. Tax variables are from the BLS. Using 
FRTW data on the asset composition of each industry each year, we aggregate asset rental prices using 
the Törnqvist method to obtain industry rental prices of capital.  
  Real capital stock, Kj,i,t, is its net property, plant and equipment (PP&E) (item 8) deflated, as in 
Hall (1990), to reflect the average age of these assets. Asset age is approximated as balance sheet 
depreciation (items 7 minus 8) over income statement depreciation and amortization (item 14). Outliers 
are removed by taking a five-year moving average and defining the age of firm j’s assets at time t, aj,t, as 
is or 20 years, whichever is less. Taking all firm j’s assets as aj,t years old, we deflate their PP&E with the 
FRTW industry deflator to estimate its real capital stock, Kj,i,t. Firm j’s capital cost share, γK,j,i,t , is one 
minus γL,j,i,t. 
  
2.4  General Patterns in the Data 
Figure 1 shows IT intensity broadly distributed and steadily rising across U.S. industries, consistent with a 
GPT.
3 By the 1990s, IT is intensively used in such traditional manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
industries as printing, apparel, wholesales, retails, motion pictures, and health services. In contrast, R&D 
(not shown) is highly concentrated in the largest firms in a few technology industries.
4 The introductory 
                                                 
3  Corroborating this, managers of about 2,000 firms spanning a broad cross-section of U.S. industries (National Science 
Foundation (NSF), 2004) report IT both lowering costs and raising quality. A 1997 survey of Fortune 500 IT managers links IT 
to improved and differentiated products (by improving customer service, targeting new customers, improving quality, and 
improving timeliness) and innovation (reducing total costs). Mukhopadhyay et al. (1997) report that IT in the U.S. Post Office 
mainly speeds up mail processing; and Athey and Stern (2002) report that IT also speeds up emergency response systems.  
4 See footnote 9 in section 3.2.2 below.   9
quote describing “A wave of innovation across a broad range of technologies” seems an apt portrayal of 
IT as a GPT.  
 
[Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 about here] 
 
  Figure 2 graphs the variance decomposition, with column heights representing average total 
variation across all industries for a given year and their coloring breaking this into industry average firm-
specific variation (white) and systematic variation (black), from [5] and [6] respectively. The 
2 R  
measure is the black section as a fraction of the total height of the column, and is graphed separately 
against time in Figure 3. Firm-specific variation in both performance metrics (stock returns and sales 
growth) rises substantially both in absolute magnitude and relative to systematic variation. Figures 2 and 
3 use industry equal-weight, but industry value-weight figures also show similar patterns. Figure 4 shows 
that this surge affects a broad swath of industries.  
  This across-the-board upsurge in the firm-specific performance variation measures seconds the 
conclusion of Wei and Zhang (2006) – any explanation of rising firm-specific variation in stock returns 
must also permit a contemporaneous rise in firm-specific fundamentals variation. Xu and Malkiel’s 
(2003) thesis of noise trading by increasingly important institutional investors cannot thus be a complete 
explanation.
5  Nor can the Morck et al.’s (2000) suggestion of increasingly efficient firm-specific 
information capitalization because this does not necessitate rise in firm-specific fundamentals variation. 
However, Fox et al. (2003), Bris et al. (2004), Durnev et al. (2004a, 2004b), Huang (2004), Li et al. 
(2004), Ozoguz (2004), Jin and Myers (2006), Veldkamp and Wolfers (2007), and others present 
evidence and theoretical arguments consistent with information capitalization and transparency being an 
important partial explanation.  
These seemingly discordant findings are reconciled if rising firm-specific performance variation 
                                                 
5 See also Dennis and Strickland (2004).   10
reflects intensified creative destruction, which is further invigorated by financial system development and 
enhanced transparency (Schumpeter, 1912; King and Levine, 1993; Durnev et al. 2004a). That is, a new 
GPT, as explained in Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005), creates potentially value-increasing innovation and 
asset recombination opportunities. As firms compete to explore and exploit these opportunities, a 
functionally efficient stock market (Tobin, 1982) prices firms’ individual probabilities of success, and 
allocates capital in an ex-ante microeconomically efficient way. Ex-post, as the process of creative 
destruction unfolds, upstarts and agile old firms unpredictably displace previous leaders and are in turn 
displaced by other upstarts or resurgent former leaders. This mechanically induces high firm-specific 
performance heterogeneity in fundamentals and stock returns, as winner and loser firms gradually emerge 
and are revealed. During this process, firm-level performance necessarily deviates from industry- and 
economy-level performance.  
  This reconciliation seems promising, for the IT intensity industry ranks from Figure 1 correlate 
significantly with each of the firm performance heterogeneity industry rank from Figure 4. Figure 5 plots 
the log of industry IT intensity against the logs of firm-specific variation in stock returns and real sales 
growth in the 1990s. A clear positive correlation is apparent in both panel, and is statistically significant 
at conventional levels.  
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
3. Regressions   
Using U.S industry panel data from 1971 to 2000, we regress firm performance heterogeneity on IT 
intensity and other relevant control variables. This section describes the regressions used to generate the 
tables. Their basic patterns of signs and significance are robust to a wide range of alternative variable 
constructions and econometric approaches, whose discussion is deferred to Section 4.  
   11
3.1  Firm Performance Heterogeneity Dependent Variables 
To obtain near normal dependent variables, we take logs of [5] and [6]. Industry i’s year t absolute firm-
specific variation is  ) ln(
2
, , t i ε σ and its absolute systematic variation is  ) ln(
2
, , t i m σ . Since [7] is bounded by 
the unit interval and highly skewed, we apply a negative logistic transformation, as in Durnev et al. 
(2004b), to obtain relative firm-specific variation,  
























Table 1 displays summary statistics and correlations for our dependent variables.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
3.2  Performance Heterogeneity Regressions 
3.2.1   Basic Setup 
Using U.S. industry panel data, we estimate weighted least squares (WLS) regressions with time and 
industry fixed effects and estimate t-statistics allowing for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
clustered by industry.
6 Specifically, we run  
[11]  ∑ ∑ + + + + + = − − t t i i i t t i t i t i u CX IT b b , 1 , 1 , 1 0
2
, , ) ln( ) ln( λ δ σε  
and 
[12]  ∑ ∑ + + + + + = − − t t i i i t t i t i t i u CX IT b b , 1 , 1 , 1 0 , ) ln( λ δ ψ   
where the dependent variable is firm performance heterogeneity, absolute or relative firm-specific 
variation in stock returns and sales growth. Since sales variation reflects three-year windows, IT intensity 
                                                 
6 Obviously, clustering the standard errors of the industry fixed effect dummies’ coefficients renders the covariance matrix 
singular. However, Arellano (1987) shows that invertiblity is restored if industry clustering is restricted to variables other than 
the industry fixed effects. See also Wooldridge (2002).    12
is averaged across the prior three-year period in those regressions; it is intended to capture investment in 
the new GPT that leads to creative destruction. Stock returns heterogeneity is measured across annual 
windows, so those regressions use lagged annual IT intensity. X is a vector of controls, which we shall 
discuss in section 3.2.2.  
Using ψi,t in [12] is equivalent to putting absolute systematic variation on the right-hand side and 
constraining its coefficient to unity. This suggests a more general specification  
[13] 
22
, , 0 1 ,1 2 , ,1 ,1 , ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) it it mit it t i it ti bb I T b C X u ε σσ δ λ −− − =+ + + + + + ∑ ∑ . 
For all regressions, the WLS weights are total assets in dollars – as of the prior year-end for stock 
returns heterogeneity regressions and averaged over the prior three years for sales growth heterogeneity 
regressions. Assets are econometrically desirable as weights because prior period sales or market 
capitalization might be correlated with current sales growth or stock returns, and so with heterogeneity 
measures constructed from these variables. Alternative weights are discussed in the robustness section 
below. WLS deprives small industries of undue influence. In our data, equal weights would give 
industries with less than 5% of the assets a 30% weight in the regressions, and industries with less than 
10% of the assets a 50% weight. 
Time fixed effects, the δt, remove common time trends and economy-wide effects, such as 
macroeconomic shocks and institutional development. This is motivated by the findings of Bushman and 
Smith (2003), Fox et al. (2003), Jin and Myers (2006), and others, linking improved accounting and 
financial transparency to increased firm-specific stock return variation; which might also correlate with 
more precisely targeted external funding of innovative firms.  
We also include industry fixed effects, the λi, because time invariant effects correlated with 
industry IT intensity might affect performance heterogeneity. Their inclusion removes all purely cross-
sectional variation from the analysis, possibly inappropriately diminishing the t-statistics of persistent 
independent variables genuinely related to performance heterogeneity. This conservative approach thus 
induces a bias against finding significant results.    13
  We use industry clustering in estimating the standard errors of coefficients because some of our 
variables may be serially correlated within industries. For example, industries with elevated stock return 
heterogeneity one year may well have elevated stock return heterogeneity the next year too. The 
overlapping three-year windows used in constructing our sales growth heterogeneity measure further 
augment any pre-existing autocorrelation in those variables. Our construction of IT intensity using a 
perpetual inventory model may induce autocorrelation in that variable as well. Time series autocorrelation 
in panel data leaves regression point estimates unbiased, but biases standard or Newey-West t-statistics 
upwards, even if fixed effects are included for both panel dimensions. Monte Carlo simulations by 
Petersen (2005) indicate that industry clustering produces unbiased standard errors in such cases. This 
technique for augmenting fixed effects with clustering is discussed in Arellano (1987) and Wooldridge 
(2002).  
 
3.2.2  Control Variables  
We now turn to the main control variables we use in our multiple regressions. These variables, which are 
argued or shown elsewhere to explain heterogeneity in one or another firm performance metric, are:  
 
Corporate Demography 
Rising firm performance heterogeneity is linked to a rising proportion of small or young firms (Campbell 
et al., 2001; Pastor and Veronesi, 2003; Fama and French, 2004; Bennett and Sias, 2005; Brown and 
Kapadia, 2005; Fink et al., 2005; Davis et al., 2006). We therefore control for average firm age and size 
in each industry. Average firm age is years since first appearance in CRSP. Average firm size is the log of 
average market cap or sales in regressions explaining firm-specific variation in returns or sales growth, 
respectively.
7  
  The economics of why small or new firms should elevate performance heterogeneity are not fully 
                                                 
7 Replacing the averages with medians produces qualitatively similar results.   14
understood. On the one hand, investors are possibly less informed about smaller and younger firms. 
Mechanically, news has a greater impact on investors’ valuation of these firms than of older and more 
mature firms; therefore smaller and younger firms’ stock return could be more volatile. Likewise, because 
of their newness and their smaller base, these firms’ sales changes could be more volatile too.   
However, creative destruction may well underlie the linkage. Schumpeter (1912) and others argue 
that new, initially small, firms are better able to explore and exploit the opportunities brought about by 
new technology because innovators can better protect their property rights over their innovations by 
organizing their own firms. King and Levine (1993), Fogel et al. (2005), and others provide empirical 
support for this view. Obviously, this does not imply that smaller firms are more efficient – indeed Fama 
and French (2004) report a lower survival rate for smaller firms in the 1990s. This might reflect a greater 
sensitivity to economic shocks, as they suggest.  But newly listed firms may also be the most enthusiastic 
early explorers and exploiters of a new GPT. Their ranks are therefore disproportionately likely to include 
both extreme winners and extreme losers.  
To the extent that sensitivity to shocks differs systematically by firm size or age, controlling for 
corporate demography is warranted. However, if firm size and age are proxies for propensity to undertake 
innovations, controlling for corporate demography might induce undesirable collinearity. Yet, if IT 
intensity remains significant despite the inclusion of firm demography controls, or in regressions based on 
samples partitioned by firm age, its significance is unlikely to be an artefact of purely demographic 
explanations.  
 
Competitive Pressure  
Intense competition is linked to elevated firm performance variation. We therefore control for each 
industry’s  Herfindahl-Hirschman index, based on annual firm sales from Compustat. For example, 
cutthroat price competition might magnify firm-specific shocks – turning minor setbacks into 
catastrophes and minor edges into lasting dominance (Philippon, 2003; Gaspar and Massa, 2004; Irvine   15
and Pontiff, 2004; Comin and Mulani, 2006). Consistent with this, low market power (Gaspar and Massa, 
2004), recent deregulation (Irvine and Pontiff, 2004), and trade liberalization (Irvine and Pontiff, 2004; Li 
et al. 2004) are associated with more heterogeneous firm performance.
8  
  A pure competition story justifies controls, but creative destruction and competition are 
interrelated. Schumpeter (1939) argues that creative destruction induces subsequent competition, as a new 
technology is standardized. Thus, Brown and Goolsbee (2002) find internet sales reducing insurance 
premiums. Or, competition might induce managers, desperate for any edge, to invest in innovation. Caves 
(1982) argues that foreign trade and investment often bring foreign ideas too; and Li et al. (2004) find 
elevated firm performance heterogeneity in countries open to the global economy. In spite of all of these 
interactions, if IT remains significant nonetheless, it is unlikely to be proxying for pure competition effect. 
  
Research and Development 
IT is not the only investment that can lead to a technological edge. Schumpeter (1942), Romer (1986), 
and others stress innovation due to R&D spending by large established firms. Kothari et al. (2002) link 
R&D to future earnings variability; Chan et al. (2001) find similar results using stock returns; and Barron 
et al. (2002) link high R&D to the lack of consensus in analysts’ forecasts. We therefore control for R&D 
intensity. R&D capital is constructed from R&D spending (Compustat item 46) using a precise analog to 
[1], substituting a 20% depreciation rate and the GDP deflator, as in Chan et al. (2001). R&D intensity is 
then an industry’s capitalized R&D over its PP&E (item 8). 
  We control for R&D because it might be both correlated to IT intensity and an alternative font of 
creative destruction. However, inspection of our variable shows R&D capital is highly concentrated in a 
                                                 
8 Acemoglu (2005) notes that deregulation is a sectoral phenomenon affecting e.g. transportation and utilities, but not already 
lightly regulated industries, and so argues that it cannot fully explain rising economy-wide firm-level volatility.    16
few industries and, within those, in the largest firms.
9 R&D thus seems an unlikely cause of an economy-
wide firm performance heterogeneity upsurge.  
 
Corporate Finance 
A firm’s leverage and liquidity might affect its firm-specific performance variation. Higher leverage, 
ceteris paribus, mechanically raises stock returns volatility, though not necessarily that of sales growth. 
Cash reserves let firms weather ill times without sacrificing key assets (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Failing 
to control for these effects might induce noise – additional firm heterogeneity unrelated to IT intensity. 
We therefore include leverage – industry short and long term debt over assets (annual items 9 plus 34 
over 6) – and liquidity – industry current assets over current liabilities (Compustat annual items 4 over 5). 
  All of this takes liquidity and leverage decisions as independent of investment decisions, but this 
may not be so. High debt capacity permits more externally financed IT, and liquidity implies access to 
internal funds, and perhaps external funds too. These interactions suggest possible collinearity between 
our financial variables and IT intensity. However, if they are unaffected, a role for creative destruction is 
more plausible.  
  In  Section 4, where we discuss various interpretation and statistical robustness, we  describe 
variants of the above controls as well as a substantial list of other controls variables – firm size 
distribution, advertising expenses, book to market ratios, capital investment, and others. Our findings are 
robust to all these alternatives.  
 
  [Table 2 about here] 
 
                                                 
9  Others find a similar concentration. In 2000, R&D spending by the industrial machinery,  transportation equipment, and 
chemical products industries accounted for almost 80% of total R&D spending in the manufacturing sector (NSF, 2003). An NSF 
survey (1999) reports 19 of the 20 firms with R&D spending above one billion dollars reside in four manufacturing industries – 
IBM and Hewlett-Packard are in industrial machinery; GE, Lucent, and Intel in electric and electronic equipment; GM and Ford 
in transportation equipment, and Johnson & Johnson and Pfizer in chemical products. Currently, Compustat classifies IBM as a 
business services firm because its sales of software and computer related services exceed its sales of computers.    17
3.2.3 Results 
Table 2 correlates firm performance heterogeneity with IT intensity and other controls (Panel A) and 
correlations among our main control variables (Panel B). Both firm performance heterogeneity in stock 
return and sales growth are positively and statistically significantly correlated with IT  intensity. The 
correlation between the performance heterogeneity measures and the controls have signs mostly 
correspond to the interpretations above, but significance levels are sporadic – and these are pooled panel 
p-levels, which are biased upwards and so overstate the significance of the correlations.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
  Table 3 reports results of regression analyses. It shows IT intensity significantly correlated with 
absolute and relative firm-specific performance heterogeneity in stock returns and sales growth, 
regardless of the controls included.
10  The  IT intensity coefficients are highly significant across 
specifications. In contrast, other controls’ coefficients, except for average firm size, are quite 
temperamental, with inconsistent signs and significance levels. This suggests that IT is the underlying 
factor most consistently associated with elevated firm-specific performance heterogeneity, and that the 
explanations associated with the various controls reflect aspects of this deeper explanation.  
Table 3 reveals that firm age is negative and significant if the dependent variables are absolute or 
relative firm-specific stock return heterogeneity. In regressions explaining sales growth heterogeneity, 
firm age is negative - but only significantly so in regressions including lagged systematic variation, 
) ln(
2
1 , , − t i m σ .  
The Herfindahl index, which proxy for competition, is insignificant in explaining absolute stock 
return heterogeneity and has the wrong, albeit significant, sign in explaining relative stock return 
                                                 
10 The only exception is the last column where relative firm-specific variation of sales growth rates is used as dependent variables 
in multiple regressions. However, no other variables has significant coefficient either except for Herfindahl index which has a 
wrong sign.  We also examine regressions on IT with the control variables used one-at-a-time.  Results are qualitatively similar to 
the case of all controls.     18
heterogeneity. It is significant and has the expected sign in explaining absolute firm-specific performance 
heterogeneity in sales growth, but has the wrong sign in explaining relative firm-specific heterogeneity.  
R&D intensity is only sporadically significant and attracts economically inconsistent signs in 
explaining firm-specific performance heterogeneity. Overall, R&D intensity does not detract from IT in 
explaining elevated firm performance heterogeneity in the U.S. in recent decades.  
These results are encouraging: they suggest that firm-specific performance heterogeneity is 
related to more intensive use of information technology (IT), a recently developed “general purpose 
technology” that stimulates creative destruction.   
 
3.3 Productivity  Regressions 
We suggest that the relationship between firm performance heterogeneity and IT intensity reflects a 
creative destruction process that stems from the advent of IT, a general purpose technology. As such, 
firm-specific performance heterogeneity should presage TFP growth.
11 Moreover, if IT accelerates TFP 
growth by fuelling creative destruction, including firm performance heterogeneity should diminish the 
coefficient and significance of IT in regressions explaining TFP growth.  
  The time horizon over which TFP growth is measured is important because Schumpeter (1912) 
explicitly links creative destruction to medium and long-run growth, and explicitly disallows a link with 
short-run growth. Annual windows are thus certainly too short; but, a very long window, such as 1971 
through 2000, allows only a single cross-section regression on a somewhat reduced sample of industry 
observations. Unobserved industry factors also become more treacherous in the latter exercise because 
industry fixed effects obviously cannot be included. We therefore follow the common practice in the 
productivity literature – see Beck et al. (2000) and, Aghion et al. (2004), and others – of defining the 
medium-run as five years and estimating productivity growth across windows of that length. We revisit 
longer window lengths as robustness checks. The five-year windows give us a 235 observation industry-
                                                 
11 Consistent with this, Durnev et al. (2004a) use country-level data to show that higher firm-specific stock return variation 
correlates with higher national TFP growth.    19
time panel of TFP growth rates defined as  ) ln( ) ln( 4 , , , − − = t i t i t i TFP TFP TFP g , where  t i TFP,  is industry i's TFP 
level in year t, from [8].  
Our WLS regressions of productivity growth are of the form  
[14]  ∑∑ + + + + + + = − − − ti t i i t t i t i m t i t i TFP TFP c c c c g , 4 , 3
2
5 , , 2
2
5 , , 1 0 , ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ω λ δ σ σ ε  
and 
[15]  ∑ ∑ + + + + + = − − tit i i t t i t i t i TFP TFP c c c g , 4 , 3 5 , 1 0 , ) ln( ω λ δ ψ  
where 
2
,, 5 ln( ) it ε σ − ,  ) ln(
2
5 , , − t i m σ and  ,5 it ψ −   are industry absolute firm-specific, absolute systematic, and 
relative firm-specific stock return variation averaged over the five-year window (t-9 to t-5) 
12 prior to that 
used to estimate  t i TFP g , . The inclusion of absolute systematic variation in [14] is motivated by Ramey 
and Ramey (1995)’s cross-country study which shows that aggregate volatility has negative impact on 
economic growth.  
We focus on firm-specific stock return heterogeneity as gauging the pace of creative destruction 
because stock returns are forward looking than sales growth rates, and therefore arguably more prescient 
of subsequent longer term outcomes. Stock return heterogeneity is also constructed from highest 
frequency data, and therefore may be estimated more precisely.   
We control for the log of the industry’s TFP level at the beginning of each TFP growth estimation 
window,  ) ln( 4 , − t i TFP , because “catching up” across industries might raise TFP growth in industries with 
lower initial TFP levels. However, if industry TFP growth converges to economy average rates – see e.g.   
Bernard and Jones (1996) regarding this debate - the error terms in our panel regressions might be 
correlated with TFP levels. Our panel, with only 41 industries, is too small for the GMM solutions to this 
quandary proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and applied by Beck et al. (2000). We therefore run [14] 
                                                 
12 Section 4.3 confirms robustness to alternative windows.   20
and [15] both with and without  ) ln( 4 , − t i TFP  to check the sensitivity of our results. The two sets of results 
are very similar. To save space, we report only the set in which  ) ln( 4 , − t i TFP  is included.  
As before, time fixed effects mitigate the influence of macroeconomic shocks and common time 
trends. Since latent industry characteristics also may affect TFP growth, we also include industry fixed 
effects and use industry clustering to obtain serial correlation and heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics, 
as in Arellano (1987) and Wooldridge (2002). Also as in the regressions in Table 3, we weight 
observations by industry size. The weights are industry total dollars of assets averaged over the prior five-
year window, from t-9 to t-5.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
These regressions, presented in Panels A and B of Table 4, clearly show that industries with 
higher firm performance heterogeneity in stock return post economically and statistically significantly 
faster subsequent TFP growth. In Panel A, the TFP growth rates are BEA industry-level figures; while the 
Panel B growth rates are calculated from our sample firms, as described in Section 2.3. The coefficients 
are smaller in the BEA measure regressions, but exhibit the same pattern of signs and statistical 
significance.  
Note how controlling for IT intensity leaves firm-specific performance heterogeneity qualitatively 
unaffected.  In contrast, IT intensity fades when performance heterogeneity is present. Regressions of 
TFP growth on initial TFP levels and IT intensity only (third columns in Panels A and B) assign the latter 
significant coefficients of 0.073 forBEA-based TFP growth, or 0.224 for Compustat-based TFP growth.  
But Table 4 shows IT intensity entirely insignificant in otherwise identical regressions of BEA-based TFP 
growth that also contain performance heterogeneity.  In regressions explaining Compustat-based TFP 
growth, the IT intensity coefficient is cut in half and its significance level is also substantially reduced.     21
 
4. Robustness  Checks 
A range of alternative approaches produce qualitatively similar results, by which we mean patterns of 
signs and significance for variables of interest identical to those in the tables.  
 
4.1  The Robustness of Our Interpretation  
We subject our interpretation to a series of robustness checks: both in terms of economics and statistics. 
We also examine robustness in terms of variable constructs and regression specifications. 
 
4.1.1 Sample  Composition   
One issue is that our data are based on listed firms – those in Compustat. Recently, Davis et al. (2006) 
report that increased firm volatility appears restricted to publicly traded firms. Our sample’s total sales 
represents, on average, about half of US GDP through the period of 1971 to 2000, rising from about 40% 
in early years to about 60% in later years.
13  
  Thus, our results need not carry to unlisted firms. However, Schumpeter (1912) explicitly notes 
that entrepreneurs often require external equity financing; and recent empirical work, surveyed in Levine 
(1997, 2005), confirms this. Because of this, effects associated with creative destruction might well be 
more evident in listed firms, consistent with the findings reported by Davis et al. (2006). However, we 
relegate attempts to understand the difference between private and publicly traded firms to future research 
effort, and caution that our results are based only on publicly traded firms. 
A second issue is firm age, for other recent work links high firm volatility to a rising proportion 
of relatively recently listed firms (e.g., Campbell et al., 2001; Pastor and Veronesi, 2003; Fama and 
French, 2004; Bennett and Sias, 2005; Brown and Kapadia, 2005; Fink et al., 2005; Davis et al., 2006). 
As noted above, young listed firms might tend to include more energetic innovators, so these findings are   22
not inconsistent with our thesis.  But creative destruction should affect old firms too.  To explore this, we 
rerun Table 3, partitioning the sample into young and old firms.   
Our median firm has been listed for eight years, so we partition the sample at age = 8 years, 
where age is the difference between year t and the firm’s listing year. The young firm subsample has a 
mean age of 3.64, a maximum age of 7, a median of 3, and a minimum 1. The old firm sample has a mean 
age of 19.03, a maximum of 54, a median of 16, and a minimum of 8 years.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Panels A and B of Table 5 report regressions results for young and old firms, respectively. The 
findings are broadly comparable across subsamples. IT intensity is significantly related to absolute 
heterogeneity in stock returns and sales growth rates in both the young and old subsamples.  Relative 
stock return heterogeneity is significant only for young firms, but relative sales growth heterogeneity is 
significant only for old firms.  Our result is thus clearly not driven by younger firms in general.   
To confirm explicitly that our finding is not an artefact of 1990s listings, we partition our sample 
at age = ten years; that is, into firms listed before versus in or after 1990. This expands the young firm 
subsample to 56% of the total, but shrinks the old firm subsample to only 44%. The results for stock 
return heterogeneity are qualitatively unaffected.  However, our sales growth heterogeneity results are 
now weaker in the old firm subsample, with only 3 significant coefficients in 6 cases, and stronger in the 
young firms subsample, with significance in all six specifications. The weaker old firm results are, in part 
at least, likely due to the smaller sample size because splitting at five years generates the opposite effect:  
weaker sales growth results for young firms (significance in 4 of 6 cases) and stronger findings for old 
firms (significance in 5 of 6 cases). Again, the stock returns findings are preserved in both subsamples. 
 Our result is thus clearly driven by neither 1990s listings; nor young firms in general.  Thus, 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 Since Compustat sales include intermediate goods as well as value-added, these are not directly comparable to the US GDP. To 
adjust for this problem in making these comparisons, we multiply average sales by the average share of value-added in sales.   23
while our finding would have been perfectly consistent with elevated firm-specific volatility primarily in 
newly listed firms, it is more general.
14    
 
4.1.2  Reverse Causality and Endogeneity?  
Reverse causality of at least two genres might arise.  One genre is not necessarily connected with creative 
destruction.  For example, exogenous productivity shocks might well induce performance heterogeneity 
and IT investment might help firms cope with increased uncertainty.
15   If the productivity shocks are 
positive on average, we might also observe accelerated productivity.  
A second genre of reverse causality arguments stem directly from our main hypothesis relating 
enhanced firm-specific performance heterogeneity to an intensification of the process of  creative 
destruction.  Schumpeter (2002), in a recently discovered “lost” seventh chapter of Schumpeter (1912), 
stresses that creative destruction is a process, “not with a causal chain of explanation” (p. 98), and goes on 
to describe a circular flow, what would now be called a positive feedback loop, with explicitly 
bidirectional causality. Innovation raises productivity, but the successes of past innovators in raising 
productivity also inspire the next generation of innovators.  Thus, reverse causality is consistent with our 
hypothesis.  Our task is to confirm direct causality, rather than to reject reverse causality.  
To do this, we must ensure that our independent variables capture only expected growth, and that 
the residuals are uncorrelated with the independent variables, lest well known endogeneity problems arise. 
To preclude such problems, we employ instrumental variables for IT intensity. These must be highly 
correlated with IT intensity, but uncorrelated with the true regression residuals.  
Since our sample excludes industries which produce IT assets, we select instruments associated 
with the supply of IT assets. As with capital investment in general, IT intensity should be related past IT 
intensity and the cost of new IT assets. We proxy for the latter using estimated marginal cost of IT 
                                                 
14 Schumpeter (1952) posits that older firms may be participate in races to innovate, and may even have an advantage over 
younger firms if huge capital outlays are required and public equity is expensive.  
15 Note that IT intensity is defined as IT capital over non-IT capital, and that this ratio could still be exogenous if TFP shocks 
have equal effects on IT and non-IT investment. However, different effects permit endogeneity, and seem not implausible a 
priori.   24
(quality) production and IT tax rates, and use these proxies as our instruments.
16  
Since marginal IT production costs are unobservable, we estimate approximations. In doing this, 
we take special care to eliminate any possible effects on marginal cost from demand side factors. 
Following Chun and Nadiri (2002), we construct the marginal cost of computer quality since this mainly 
depends on the efficiency of R&D expenditures in the IT-producing sector; rather than demand-side 
factors. We measure the quality of computers as the ratio of list (unit) prices to hedonic prices, and 
calculate the marginal cost of quality by estimating a flexible cost function.
17 Finally, we multiply this 
marginal cost by each industry’s beginning-of-year IT intensity to estimate marginal cost of IT (quality) 
production costs for each sector. 
We estimate IT tax rates using asset-specific tax parameters. These are tax-related components of 
the rental price of capital, defined as  ,, , (1 ) /(1 ) kt kt t kt t Tax u z u ζ ≡ −− −  for asset k at time t, with ζk,t the 
effective rate of the investment tax credit, ut the corporate income tax rate, and zk,t the present value of a 
dollar of tax depreciation allowances. These variables, in turn, are all from the BLS. Using the IT asset 
composition of each industry each year, we aggregate our IT tax parameters using the Törnqvist method.  
Well-known weak instruments problems can seriously bias instrumental variables techniques of 
the sort we undertake, even in large samples. Our tax rate and marginal cost pass standard weak 
instruments test criteria, and thus are acceptable as instrumental variables.
18  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
                                                 
16 We are most grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this procedure. 
17 Hedonic and list prices are from the BEA’s FRTW data and the Census Bureau’s Current Industrial Reports, respectively. 
Assuming a translog cost function including both the quality and quantity of computers, the marginal costs of quality and 
quantity are estimated separately. See Chun and Nadiri (2002) for the details. 
18 First, our first stage F-statistics are on average larger than 350 which is much greater than the approximate cut off of 10 for 
weak instruments suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005). Second, we perform Anderson Rubin confidence test to check the 
significance of the second stage regression. This test is valid whether instruments are strong, weak or even irrelevant. Third, we 
estimate the second stage coefficient using Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) method suggested by Stock et al. 
(2002) and implemented by Moreira and Poi (2003). Anderson Rubin tests show that LIML coefficients are not statistically 
different from Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) coefficients. We are grateful for Prof. James Stock for many helpful comments 
and suggestions on the issue of weak instruments.   25
Table 6 reports our results, replicating those in Table 3 but now using instrumental variables 
estimation techniques. In eleven of the twelve alternative specifications, IT intensity remains positively 
significantly related to firm performance heterogeneity.  Overall, these results are consistent with direct 
causality – industry IT intensity ‘causing’ firm-specific performance heterogeneity. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
Table 7 partitions the sample into young and old firms, as in Table 5, but now runs instrumental 
variable regressions, as in Table 6. The Table 5 results hold up well in regressions of firm-specific stock 
return heterogeneity, with IT intensity attracting positive significant coefficients in five of the six 
alternative specifications for both young and old firms.   The sales growth heterogeneity regressions are 
weaker, with IT intensity retaining significance in four of six specifications for young firms and three of 
six for old firms. Note however, that the rough magnitudes of the point estimates are broadly similar 
across comparable specifications in Tables 5 and 6. As with the Table 5 regressions, an alternative 
partition at age = ten years generates qualitatively similar results for stock return heterogeneity in both 
subsamples, but generates stronger results for sales growth heterogeneity using young firms. In contrast, 
partitioning at age = five years renders IT intensity significant in only two IV sales growth heterogeneity 
specifications for young firms, but in three for old firms; and in only four of six IV stock return 
heterogeneity specifications for young firms, but in all six for old firms.   
We conclude that causality runs from stepped up IT intensity to magnified firm-specific 
performance heterogeneity in both young and old firms, but this is more certain if heterogeneity is 
measured using stock returns than using sales growth.     
Table 8 re-examines the impact of firm performance heterogeneity on TFP growth using our tax 
rate and marginal cost estimates as instruments for the component of the former associated with 
exogenous changes in IT. Note that, to avoid collinearity, we cannot include instrumented IT intensity in 
these regressions. As in the previous round of estimates, firm-performance heterogeneity remains   26
significantly positively related to both measures of TFP growth. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
4.2  The Robustness of Our Performance Heterogeneity Regressions 
4.2.1 Alternative  Variables 
Previously Used Proxies for Creative Destruction 
To confirm that our results reflect creative destruction, we consider alternative dependent variables 
previously used to gauge that process. Fogel et al. (2005), using country-level data, show that faster 
turnover in a country’s list of leading firms, which they use to proxy for creative destruction, correlates 
with faster per capita GDP and productivity growth. Comin and Philippon (2005) use conceptually 
analogous measures of leading firm turnover rates for US industries from Compustat data. We follow 
their approach, defining the turnover rate in industry i in year t as the probability of a leading firm leaving 
the industry’s top quintile over a five-year period. Further following Comin and Philippon (2005), we 
estimate turnover ranking leading firm by market value, operating income and sales. We then generate an 
analog to Table 3, but with these turnover measures, rather than firm-specific performance heterogeneity, 
as dependent variables. The results, shown in Table 9, are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3 – IT 
intensity remains positive and significant across all specifications, while the other controls (except size) 
have insignificant and inconsistent signs. 
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
Alternative Ways of Estimating Firm Performance Heterogeneity Measure 
As further robustness checks, we consider alternative constructions of sales firm-specific performance 
heterogeneity measures constructed with five-year, rather than three-year, windows; and using non-  27
overlapping, rather than overlapping, three-year windows (i.e. dropping two of every three years). All 
generate qualitatively similar results, except for reduced significance levels if the dependent variable is 
relative firm-specific sales growth heterogeneity constructed using five-year windows.  
We require complete data for a firm to be included in estimating the firm-specific performance 
heterogeneity of its industry. Repeating our tests including firms with one, two, or three missing 
observations generates qualitatively similar results to those shown. We drop firm-quarter observations 
with Compustat footnotes. Retaining them generates qualitatively similar results. In estimating sales 
growth heterogeneity, we scale by the average of current and lagged sales in [3]. Using the earlier 
period’s sales as the denominator yields qualitatively similar results.  
  Extreme values may affect our heterogeneity estimates. Rerunning [4] using data winsorized at 
1% does not qualitatively change our results. Neither does winsorizing the firm performance 
heterogeneity measures directly. 
Table 3 uses variables constructed using value weighted industry and market indexes in 
regression [4]. Equal weighted indexes generate qualitatively similar results in regressions with absolute 
firm performance heterogeneity as dependent variables. When relative firm performance heterogeneity 
measures are used as dependent variables, results are weaker, perhaps again reflecting an overly 
restrictive specification of [12] when compared with [13], rather than genuine economic insignificance. 
 
Alternative Estimates of IT Intensity  
Furthermore, we check the robustness of the construction of IT intensity. We use Törnqvist indexes to 
aggregate IT assets deflated by BEA hedonic prices (BEA, 1998). Alternative indexes without 
adjustments for inflation generate qualitatively similar results.  
 
Alternative Constructions of Other Variables  
We gauge firm age by the number of years of CRSP data. This underestimates the ages of firms with 
early NASDAQ listings, listings on regional or foreign exchanges, and prior histories as unlisted firms.   28
An alternative estimate of firm age (Hall, 1990) divides balance sheet depreciation by income statement 
depreciation (Compustat annual items 7 less 8 all over 14) to obtain a rough estimate of the age of the 
firm’s depreciable assets. This measure is highly positively correlated with years in CRSP (ρ = 0.49, p 
<< .01) and substituting it into our regressions leaves our results qualitatively unchanged.  
  Our Herfindahl indexes are based on sales. Asset-based Herfindahls generate qualitatively similar 
results.  
  We capitalize R&D spending in our R&D control variable. Although this has solid economic 
justification, R&D spending is nonetheless often used as a proxy for R&D capital stock – see e.g. Morck 
et al. (1988). Using simple current or lagged R&D spending over assets generates qualitatively similar 
results to those shown.  
 
4.2.2  Alternative Econometric Approaches 
The regressions in Table 3 weight observations by industry total asset. Weighting instead by industry 
market capitalization or industry sales generates qualitatively similar results. So do equally weighted 
regressions for stock return heterogeneity; and for sales growth heterogeneity if we drop industries with 
weights below 0.5% of the sample total. Using fixed weights, average assets for 1966 through 1970, also 
generates qualitatively similar results.  
  Figure 5 presents scatter plots of ln(
2
ε σ ) for stock returns and sales growth against IT intensity. 
These show broad-based positive correlations, clearly not driven by outliers. More formally, winsorizing 
all variables at 1% generates qualitatively similar results.  
  An alternative to clustered standard errors, devised by Pontiff (1996), modifies Fama-MacBeth 
regressions by appending the method of Newey and West (1987). Petersen (2005) shows that serial 
correlations can generate inflated t-statistics even with this correction. Still, the method is widely used 
and may have other advantages. In fact, modified Fama-MacBeth regressions yield stronger results than 
those shown in regression tables of the paper.    29
 
4.2.3  Additional Control Variables 
We repeat our performance heterogeneity multiple regressions, supplemented with various additional 
controls. None changes the results qualitatively.  
We control for average size of firm in each industry. As a robustness check, we also consider the 
distribution of firm size for each industry. Using the standard deviation of the logarithms of firm market 
capitalization, sales, or total assets to control for firm-size dispersion yields qualitatively similar results to 
those shown.  
  IT and R&D are clearly not the only sources of innovation or creative destruction. Creative 
innovations might also arise from unique marketing strategies and any number of other sources. We 
therefore include industry advertising expenses over property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) (Compustat 
item 45 over item 8) as an additional control. As a more general measure of intangible assets, we also 
include book to market ratios, industry total book value of equity over its corresponding market value (the 
industry total of annual item 60 over the sum of the products of 25 and 199). Including either or both of 
these variables does not qualitatively change our results.  
  Investment in conventional capital assets might conceivably increase firm performance 
heterogeneity by increasing uncertainty about a firm’s future cash flows. We therefore control for non-IT 
capital investment (industry aggregate non-IT investment over industry aggregate non-IT capital, as 
defined in section 2.1). Qualitatively similar results ensue.  
  Irvine and Pontiff (2004) consider import penetration, which is only available for manufacturing 
industries. If we include import penetration as an added control, the IT variable remains significant, 
except for regressions of relative firm-specific performance heterogeneity. However, in these regressions, 
both IT and import penetration become insignificant, perhaps reflecting the smaller sample (n = 19). 
Import penetration exhibits little time variation, and so may be collinear with industry fixed effects. 
  Firms with operations in more industries, all else equal, track the market more closely and their 
primary industry indexes less closely. Depending on which effect is greater, this might systematically   30
raise or lower their firm-specific performance variation relative to that of pure-play firms. Also, Agarwal 
et al. (2004) argue that diversification raises investor uncertainty and increases stock return variation; and 
Morck  et al. (1989) argue that investors view diversification per se as evidence of firm-specific 
governance problems. We gauge average firm diversification by the number of two-digit industries in 
which it reports positive sales, and average this for each industry each year. Compustat’s Industry 
Segment files are available from 1985 on, but change format drastically in December 1998, when SFAS 
131 superseded FASB 14. We thus have comparable data for this variable only from 1985 through 1998. 
Controlling for diversification leaves IT intensity with significant coefficients similar to those in Table 3 
in regressions of absolute firm-specific variation measure of sales growth, but insignificant in the other 
specifications. The less robust significance could reflect the shorter panel, rather than genuine economic 
insignificance. There is little variation in industry average diversification over time, and dropping 
industry fixed effects again restores the full pattern of signs and significance for IT intensity in the tables.  
  Multinational firms are subject to shocks, like currency fluctuations and foreign demand 
fluctuations, which barely affect purely domestic firms. But foreign sales can also dampen domestic 
shocks. We control for foreign exposure using industry foreign sales over total sales from Compustat. 
These data yield the same pattern of results as industry diversification and are subject to the same 
limitations.  
 
4.3  The Robustness of Our Productivity Regressions  
Recall that BEA industry TFP growth and TFP growth estimated from Compustat generate largely 
qualitatively similar results, described in section 3.3. Including unlisted firms, as in the BEA figures, does 
not affect our results.  
Our TFP growth results survive several additional robustness checks.  
To avoid any possible correlation between our regression weights and error terms, we re-estimate 
our results using out-of-sample weights, 1966 to 1970 average assets, in all time periods and observe 
qualitatively similar results. In equally weighted regressions, firm performance heterogeneity is   31
significant only if initial TFP levels are also included – even in regressions excluding industries with 
weights below 0.5% of the sample total. This might indicate noisier TFP growth or performance 
heterogeneity estimates for smaller industries, or perhaps more vigorous creative destruction in larger 
industries. Since growth in larger industries is ostensibly most economically important, even the latter 
preserves the economic significance of our results. 
Five-year periods might be too short to capture the full impact on TFP of creative destruction 
associated with IT capital. To examine the effect of creative destruction in a longer horizon, we run a 
cross-section regression of thirty-year industry TFP growth on firm performance heterogeneity, averaged 
across the same years, and controls. This yields the same pattern of signs and significance as Table 4.  
Another issue is the window length used for the regressor variable – firm performance 
heterogeneity. Table 4 uses the average across the five years prior to the beginning of the five-year 
window over which the regressand, TFP growth, is estimated. Repeating the exercise using stock return 
heterogeneity measured instead over a one or three-year period prior to the TFP growth estimation 
window attracts coefficients roughly one fifth and three-fifths, respectively, as large as those in Table 4, 
though p-levels fall short of statistical significance in specifications without initial TFP. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Elevated firm performance heterogeneity – cross-sectional firm-specific variation in individual firms’ 
stock returns and real sales growth – is associated with intensive investment in information technology 
(IT). These findings are robust to a wide range of specifications, control variables, and econometric 
approaches.  
Our results support IT serving as a general purpose technology (GPT), inducing a wave of 
innovation across many industries. Some firms make good use of these opportunities, while others do not, 
widening a chasm between winner and loser firms. This firm performance heterogeneity is a readily 
observable measure of ongoing creative destruction, the process which Schumpeter (1912) argues   32
sustains economic growth. Consistent with this, industries with elevated firm performance heterogeneity 
exhibit faster total factor productivity (TFP) growth.  
This interpretation of firm-specific performance heterogeneity permits reinterpretation of several 
recent findings regarding firm-specific stock returns and fundamentals variation, viz.  
 
1.  Creative destruction is more intense in higher income countries 
Stocks in countries with higher incomes (Morck et al., 2000) or faster economic growth (Durnev 
et al. 2004a) exhibit higher firm-specific return variation. If this reflects more intense creative 
destruction, these findings support Aghion et al.’s (2005) theoretical prediction of more creative 
destruction in higher income countries, and factor accumulation in lower income countries. They 
also more generally support the theories of Schumpeter (1912), and their formalizations by 
Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998), Aghion et al. (2004, 2005), and Acemoglu et al. (2005, 2006), 
which link economic growth to the rise of innovative firms and the decline of stagnant ones.  
 
2.  Creative destruction is more intense if private property rights are stronger  
Morck  et al. (2000) link greater firm-specific performance heterogeneity to the quality of 
government, by which they mean an absence of corruption, an efficiency judiciary, and a general 
respect for the rule of law. La Porta et al. (1999) argue that governments that provide these 
institutional public goods are protecting private property rights. La Porta et al. (2006) show 
effective private property rights protection to be a necessary condition for financial development. 
These support Baumol (1990), Murphy et al. (1991), Gans et al. (2002), and others who argue 
that sound private property rights are a precondition for creative destruction. 
 
3.  Creative destruction is more intense if corporations are more transparent 
La Porta et al. (2006) argue that corporate transparency is critical to making investors’ de jure   33
protection effective. Morck et al. (2000), Bris et al. (2004), Durnev et al. (2004a), Fox (2003), 
Huang (2004), Ozoguz (2004), and Jin and Myers (2006) all link corporate transparency to firm-
specific variation. Our findings suggest one possible underlying economic explanation: better 
accounting disclosure and more generally transparent stock markets permit entrepreneurs to raise 
external funds to invest in new technologies, like IT, by making capital more secure and cheaper.  
 
4.  Creative destruction is more intense if financial systems are more developed  
Schumpeter (1912) argues that entrepreneurs are often penurious, and so need financing to 
develop their innovations. He therefore argues that a well developed financial system is a 
prerequisite for growth through creative destruction. Consistent with this, King and Levine (1993) 
show financial development to be of first order importance to economic growth. Wurgler (2000) 
links greater firm-specific performance heterogeneity to financial development. Bris et al. (2004) 
and Durnev et al. (2004a) show higher firm-specific stock return variation in more financially 
developed countries. Durnev et al. (2004a) also report higher TFP growth in countries with 
elevated firm-specific stock return variation. Davis et al. (2006) report that the increase in firm-
level volatility found by Morck et al. (2000), Campbell et al. (2001), and others in U.S. stocks is 
evident only in listed firms. This accords with Schumpeter’s (1912) argument that creative 
destruction requires external financing, and suggests that public equity financing might be 
especially important.  
Given these linkages, the findings of Morck et al. (2000) and Jin and Myers (2006) can 
be reinterpreted as indirectly supporting the importance of financial development to creative 
destruction.  
 
5.  Creative destruction is more intense in more financially open economies 
Li et al. (2004) show that firm-specific stock return variation rises in emerging economies after   34
they open to international portfolio investment. Caves (1982) and other argue that openness 
encourages technology transfer, so the effect Li et al. (2004) observe could partially reflect 
creative destruction associated with the new technology.  
 
6.  Creative destruction need not destabilize the macroeconomy  
Durnev et al. (2004a) find faster growth in countries whose stock returns display greater firm-
specific variation, while Ramey and Ramey (1995) find countries with elevated macroeconomic 
variation growing slower.
19  The two results are not mutually exclusive because firm-specific 
variation cancels out in aggregate measures. This fallacy of composition in variation means that 
the elevated firm-specific variation associated with creative destruction can aggregate into low 
volatility in macroeconomic growth.
20  
 
Our thesis that elevated firm performance heterogeneity signals intensified creative destruction in 
no way excludes other explanations of firm-specific performance variation. Philippon (2003), Gaspar and 
Massa (2004), and Irvine and Pontiff (2004) emphasize increased competition, and Schumpeter (1939) 
posits that waves of creative destruction induce subsequent waves of price competition. Pastor and 
Veronesi (2003), Fama and French (2004), Bennett and Sias (2005), Brown and Kapadia (2005), Fink et 
al. (2005) and Davis et al. (2006) link rising firm-specific stock returns variation to the growing 
importance of smaller, younger firms. This also dovetails with our thesis, for Schumpeter (1912) argues 
that new, initially small firms are the carriers of new technology and the harbingers of creative destruction. 
We believe that our thesis underscores the importance of these findings and other findings regarding firm-
specific performance heterogeneity by providing a unifying framework for this emerging literature. This 
need not, of course, preclude other partial explanations, and we welcome further work in this area. 
                                                 
19 Ramey and Ramey interpret their finding as decreased uncertainty spurring investment, as in Pindyck (1991).  
20
Comin and Mulani (2005) model firm-specific risk rising and systematic risk falling as firms shift their R&D towards inimitable 
innovations and away from inimitable ones, and argue that such a shift occurred in the U.S. in recent decades. This is consistent with 
   GPT applications being hard to imitate initially, when their contribution to TFP growth is greatest, as in Schumpeter (1939).  
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Figure 1.  Cross-Industry Distributions of IT Intensities in the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s in U.S. Industries. 
Information technology (IT) intensity is computer hardware and software assets divided by other assets. Data are 
sorted by the average IT intensity of the 1990s. 
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Figure 2.  Firm Performance Total Variation and Decomposition by Year 
Mean (industry equal-weight) total variation in firm-level performance decomposed into mean systematic (related to 
industry and economy factors) and mean firm-specific variation. Stock return variation is based on 12 monthly 
observations per year. Real sales growth variation is based on 12 quarterly observations from three-year rolling 
windows ending in the year indicated on the horizontal axis. 
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Figure 3.  Systematic Variation in Firm Performance as Fraction of Total Variation  
The figure shows the fraction of variation in stock returns and in real sales growth explained by market and industry 
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Figure 4.  Cross-Industry Distributions of Firm-Specific Stock Return Variation in 
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. 
Industries are sorted by the 1990s’ firm-specific variation. H indicates industries with IT intensity in the top tertile of 
the sample for that decade. M and L indicate industries in the middle and lower tertiles, respectively. 
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Figure 5.  Firm-Specific Performance Variation and IT Intensity 
These graphs plot the log of average IT intensity in the 1990s (x-axis) against the log of average firm-specific 
variation in the 1990s (y-axis). The size of each bubble indicates the industry’s total assets.  
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Table 1.  Industry Summary Statistics: Firm-Specific Performance Heterogeneity 
and Information Technology Intensity 
Firm-specific performance variation by year is residual variation in firm-level regressions of total stock return and real 
sales growth on market and industry averages (weighted) of those variables. Industry averages exclude the firm in 
question to avoid spurious correlation problems in small industries where one firm is a substantial part of the industry. 
Absolute firm-specific variation, ln(
2
ε σ ), and relative firm-specific variation, ln(
2
ε σ ) – ln(
2
m σ ), are estimated using 12 
monthly observations of stock return for each year. Real sales growth variation measures are constructed using 12 
quarterly observations over three-year rolling windows. We only include firms with 12 month observations in case of 
stock and 12 quarterly observations in case of real sales growth. The sample period is 1971 to 2000. Sample is all 
firms in CRSP and Compustat in the 50 manufacturing and non-manufacturing (approximately two-digit) industries 
excluding the finance sector (SIC 6000 to 6999). We exclude industries with fewer than 5 firms, or whose IT capital is 
not defined for each year. Two IT-producing industries are also excluded. IT capital is defined as the sum of 
computers and software. IT intensity is defined as the ratio of IT capital over non-IT capital.  
 
Panel A. Summary statistics 
Firm Performance Heterogeneity 




Absolute Firm-Specific Variation         
  Stock returns  -4.279 -4.298  -6.520  -2.404  0.597  1180 
  Sales growth  -3.801 -3.824  -6.676  -1.232  0.986  1010 
Relative Firm-Specific Variation         
  Stock returns  0.859 0.886  -1.025  3.122 0.528 1180 
  Sales growth  0.697 0.707  -2.828  2.884 0.690 1010 
ln(Information Technology Intensity)  -5.135 -5.010  -10.587 -0.590  1.829  1290 
 
Panel B. Correlations coefficients 
Stock Returns  Sales Growth 
  Absolute Relative Absolute 
Stock Returns      
Relative  0.406    
  (0.000)    
Sales Growth      
Absolute  0.544 0.283   
  (0.000) (0.000)   
Relative  0.250 0.192  0.412 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Numbers in parentheses are probability levels. Coefficients significant at 10% or better are in boldface. 
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Table 2.  Correlation Coefficients  
Age is the average age of firms in an industry based on years listed in CRSP. Size is average market capitalization or 
sales of a firm in an industry, respectively. Herfindahl index is sales-based. R&D is estimated R&D capital stock over 
PP&E. Leverage is short-term plus long-term debt over total assets. Liquidity is current assets over current liabilities. 
Numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the null hypothesis of zero correlation can be rejected. 
Coefficients significant at 10% or better are in boldface. 
 
Panel A. Correlations of firm performance heterogeneity and IT intensity with control variables 
Stock Returns  Sales Growth  ln(IT) 
 
Absolute Relative Absolute Relative   
Information Tech.       
ln(IT)  0.536 0.451 0.511 0.382   
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
Demography       
ln(Age)  -0.369  -0.021  -0.220  0.006 -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.472) (0.000) (0.857) (0.974) 
ln(Size)  -0.017  0.183  0.005  0.115 0.265 
  (0.566) (0.000) (0.867) (0.000) (0.000) 
Competition       
Herfindahl  -0.007 0.048 -0.040 0.023 -0.085 
  (0.823) (0.103) (0.205) (0.461) (0.003) 
Technology       
ln(1+R&D)  0.249 0.066 0.266 0.060 0.238 
  (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.056) (0.000) 
Financing       
Leverage  0.030 0.031 0.102 0.092 -0.124 
  (0.305) (0.285) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) 
Liquidity  -0.058 -0.073 -0.102 -0.106 -0.004 
  (0.046) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001) (0.896) 
 
Panel B. Correlations of control variables with each other 
  Demography Competition  Technology  Financing 
  ln(Age) ln(Size)  Herfindahl  ln(1+R&D)  Leverage 
Demography        
ln(Size)  0.506      
  (0.000)        
Competition       
Herfindahl  -0.428 -0.225     
  (0.000) (0.000)       
Technology       
ln(1+ R&D)  -0.074  -0.038 -0.042     
  (0.009) (0.176) (0.138)     
Financing       
Leverage  -0.194 -0.118 0.227 -0.209   
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
Liquidity  -0.037  -0.349 0.061 0.108 -0.440 
  (0.192) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 3.  Panel Regressions of Firm-Specific Performance Heterogeneity on IT Intensity and Controls, with Time 
and Industry Fixed Effects 
Dependent variables are industry-level measures of firm-specific heterogeneity in stock returns or sales growth rates. Within each set, the first four columns have 
absolute firm-specific variation ln( 2
ε σ ), as their dependent variables; while the last two columns use relative firm-specific variation, ln( 2
ε σ ) – ln( 2
m σ ), where ln( 2
m σ ) is 
absolute systematic variation. IT intensity, IT, is the ratio of IT capital (computers and software) to other capital. Age is the average age of firms in an industry, 
defined as years listed in CRSP. Size is the average market capitalization or sales of the firms in each industry in the returns and sales growth heterogeneity 
regressions, respectively. The Herfindahl index is sales-based. R&D is estimated R&D capital stock over PP&E. Leverage is short plus long-term debt over total 
assets. Liquidity is current assets over current liabilities. Stock return variation is estimated using 12 monthly observations each year. Real sales growth variation is 
constructed using 12 quarterly observations over three-year rolling windows. In constructing variation measures, firms with fewer than 12 observations are 
excluded. IT intensity and controls are lagged by one year for returns variation regressions, and averaged over lagged three-year windows for sales growth 
variation regressions. All regressions include time and industry fixed effects. Observations are weighted by lagged total assets in the returns variation regressions 
and average industry total assets over lagged three year-windows for sales growth variation regressions. The sample period is 1971 to 2000. The sample excludes 
IT-producing industries, finance industries (SIC 6000 to 6999), industries with fewer than 5 firms, and industries whose IT capital is ill defined. Numbers in 
parentheses are probability levels for rejecting the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient, based on t-statistics adjusted for industry clustering to eliminate bias due to 
serial dependence within industries. Coefficients significant at 10% or better are in boldface.  


























ln(IT) 0.256 0.202 0.216 0.180 0.105 0.096 0.323 0.202 0.242 0.176 0.106 0.106
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.003) (0.000) (0.046) (0.021) (0.015) (0.038) (0.128)
Corporate Demography
ln(Age) -0.345 -0.302 -0.149 -0.744 -0.659 -0.058
(0.086) (0.076) (0.087) (0.165) (0.057) (0.672)
ln(Size) -0.173 -0.155 -0.163 -0.424 -0.295 0.004
(0.045) (0.023) (0.001) (0.074) (0.047) (0.973)
Competition
Herfindahl -0.764 -0.250 1.120 -2.348 -4.052 1.314
(0.261) (0.681) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Technology
ln(1+R&D) 0.012 0.323 -1.135 -0.595 1.492 -0.219
(0.982) (0.486) (0.000) (0.530) (0.017) (0.740)
Financing
Leverage -1.587 -1.228 -0.356 -3.439 -2.529 -0.943
(0.007) (0.011) (0.192) (0.002) (0.000) (0.137)
Liquidity 0.149 0.158 0.127 -0.188 -0.295 -0.173
(0.293) (0.162) (0.098) (0.607) (0.304) (0.575)
Systematic Variation
Abs. Systematic 0.264 0.196 0.292 0.167
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Adjusted R
2
0.773 0.801 0.784 0.800 0.639 0.653 0.705 0.757 0.737 0.787 0.466 0.474
Sample size 1180 1180 1142 1142 1180 1180 1010 1010 930 930 1010 1010
Stock Returns Sales Growth 
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Table 4.  Panel Regressions of TFP Growth on Firm-Specific Performance 
Heterogeneity and Controls, with Time and Industry Fixed Effects  
Panel data are U.S. industries followed from 1971 to 2000, across six non-overlapping five-year interval (1971-1975, 
… , 1996-2000). The dependent variable is industry TFP growth rate during each five-year interval. Initial TFP is 
measured at the beginning year at each interval. Performance heterogeneity measures and IT intensity are the 
average of values over the prior five-year interval, (t-9, t-5). All regressions include time and industry fixed effects. 
Observations are weighted by the industry’s total assets, averaged over the prior window. The sample excludes IT-
producing industries, finance industries (SIC 6000 to 6999), and industries with fewer than 5 firms available for 
constructing TFP growth rates or performance heterogeneity measures, as well industries whose IT capital is ill 
defined. Panel A uses BEA industry-level TFP figures; while Panel B uses TFP measures constructed from 
Compustat firms. Numbers in parentheses are probability levels, based on t-statistics adjusted for industry clustering. 
Coefficients significant at 10% or better are in boldface.  
 
Panel A. TFP growth defined using BEA industry-level data 
  4a.1 4a.2 4a.3 4a.4 4a.5 
Performance Heterogeneity       
0.195     0.147    Absolute firm-specific return variation, ln(
2
ε σ ) 
(0.001)    (0.092)  
-0.105    -0.077   Absolute systematic returns variation, ln(
2
m σ ) 
(0.272)    (0.328)  





 (0.002)    (0.101) 
Controls       
   0.073  0.037 0.046  ln(IT) 
   (0.030)  (0.473)  (0.282) 
-0.140 -0.133 -0.133 -0.139 -0.134  Initial ln(TFP) 
(0.316) (0.324) (0.297) (0.306) (0.305) 
Adjusted R
2   0.693 0.690 0.690 0.694 0.693 
Sample size  235 235 234 234 234 
 
Panel B. TFP growth defined using Compustat sample firms 
  4b.1 4b.2 4b.3 4b.4 4b.5 
Performance Heterogeneity       
0.643     0.526    Absolute firm-specific return variation, ln(
2
ε σ ) 
(0.000)    (0.001)  
-0.289    -0.214   Absolute systematic returns variation, ln(
2
m σ ) 
(0.165)    (0.237)  





 (0.001)     (0.003) 
Controls       
   0.224 0.087 0.126  ln(IT) 
   (0.005)  (0.072)  (0.017) 
-0.446 -0.413 -0.453 -0.450 -0.425  Initial ln(TFP) 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adjusted R
2   0.815 0.798 0.790 0.819 0.806 
Sample size  235 235 234 234 234 
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Table 5.  Panel Regressions of Firm-Specific Performance Heterogeneity on IT Intensity and Controls, with Time 
and Industry Fixed Effects, for Separate New and Old Firm Subsamples 
Dependent variables are industry-level measures of firm-specific heterogeneity in stock returns or sales growth rates. Within each set, the first four columns have 
absolute firm-specific variation ln( 2
ε σ ), as their dependent variables; while the last two columns use relative firm-specific variation, ln( 2
ε σ ) – ln( 2
m σ ), where ln( 2
m σ ) is 
absolute systematic variation. IT intensity, IT, is the ratio of IT capital (computers and software) to other capital. Age is the average age of firms in an industry, 
defined as years listed in CRSP. Size is the average market capitalization or sales of the firms in each industry in the returns and sales growth heterogeneity 
regressions, respectively. The Herfindahl index is sales-based. R&D is estimated R&D capital stock over PP&E. Leverage is short plus long-term debt over total 
assets. Liquidity is current assets over current liabilities. Stock return variation is estimated using 12 monthly observations each year. Real sales growth variation is 
constructed using 12 quarterly observations over three-year rolling windows. In constructing variation measures, firms with fewer than 12 observations are 
excluded. IT intensity and controls are lagged by one year for returns variation regressions, and averaged over lagged three-year windows for sales growth 
variation regressions. All regressions include time and industry fixed effects. Observations are weighted by lagged total assets in the returns variation regressions 
and average industry total assets over lagged three-year windows for sales growth variation regressions. The sample period is 1971 to 2000. The sample excludes 
IT-producing industries, finance industries (SIC 6000 to 6999), industries with fewer than 5 firms, and industries whose IT capital is ill defined. Numbers in 
parentheses are probability levels for rejecting the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient, based on t-statistics adjusted for industry clustering to eliminate bias due to 
serial dependence within industries. Coefficients significant at 10% or better are in boldface.  
Panel A reports regression results for a young firm subsample, which contains firms younger than the median age of eight years as a listed firm in CRSP. Panel B 
reports regression results for an old firm subsample, which contains firms that have been listed in CRSP for eight years or more.    54



























ln(IT) 0.407 0.352 0.325 0.296 0.082 0.074 0.442 0.244 0.293 0.211 0.115 0.116
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.027) (0.012) (0.000) (0.067) (0.005) (0.064) (0.128) (0.209)
Corporate Demography
ln(Age) -0.098 -0.041 -0.207 -1.115 -0.919 0.126
(0.639) (0.826) (0.081) (0.029) (0.004) (0.705)
ln(Size) -0.231 -0.175 -0.190 -0.392 -0.303 0.085
(0.054) (0.072) (0.008) (0.156) (0.172) (0.451)
Competition
Herfindahl 0.308 0.326 0.979 3.422 2.368 0.563
(0.738) (0.691) (0.003) (0.368) (0.461) (0.696)
Technology
ln(1+R&D) -0.739 0.044 -0.797 -0.046 1.606 0.573
(0.327) (0.942) (0.004) (0.964) (0.040) (0.488)
Financing
Leverage -1.317 -1.084 -0.459 -1.825 -0.895 -1.549
(0.009) (0.008) (0.051) (0.065) (0.322) (0.005)
Liquidity 0.418 0.342 0.012 0.364 -0.147 -0.215
(0.080) (0.100) (0.870) (0.195) (0.504) (0.467)
Systematic Variation
Abs. Systematic 0.204 0.161 0.161 0.118
(0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Adjusted R
2
0.654 0.685 0.646 0.664 0.547 0.557 0.700 0.727 0.712 0.729 0.417 0.421
Sample size 1055 1055 1025 1025 1055 1055 793 793 706 706 793 793
Stock Returns Sales Growth 
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ln(IT) 0.152 0.079 0.131 0.082 0.060 0.059 0.322 0.245 0.284 0.222 0.210 0.186
(0.004) (0.025) (0.004) (0.037) (0.320) (0.185) (0.025) (0.056) (0.091) (0.054) (0.012) (0.029)
Corporate Demography
ln(Age) -0.368 -0.307 -0.025 -0.435 -0.499 -0.259
(0.210) (0.204) (0.822) (0.407) (0.181) (0.285)
ln(Size) -0.238 -0.243 -0.214 -0.165 -0.113 0.096
(0.028) (0.005) (0.000) (0.566) (0.649) (0.365)
Competition
Herfindahl -0.935 -0.349 1.146 -4.414 -6.008 0.635
(0.093) (0.465) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.185)
Technology
ln(1+R&D) 1.332 1.392 -0.881 -0.522 1.994 0.189
(0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.647) (0.051) (0.798)
Financing
Leverage -1.096 -0.669 -0.009 -3.520 -3.029 -1.446
(0.071) (0.135) (0.968) (0.029) (0.010) (0.022)
Liquidity 0.304 0.310 0.162 -0.445 -0.520 -0.122
(0.070) (0.022) (0.083) (0.279) (0.112) (0.680)
Systematic Variation
Abs. Systematic 0.319 0.226 0.161 0.087
(0.000) (0.000) (0.065) (0.124)
Adjusted R
2
0.783 0.818 0.807 0.827 0.673 0.687 0.513 0.564 0.509 0.578 0.379 0.382
Sample size 1100 1100 1066 1066 1100 1100 949 949 868 868 949 949
Stock Returns Sales Growth 
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Table 6.  Two-Stage Panel Regressions of Firm-Specific Performance Heterogeneity on IT Intensity and Controls, 
with Time and Industry Fixed Effects 
Dependent variables are industry-level measures of firm-specific heterogeneity in stock returns or sales growth rates. Within each set, the first four columns have 
absolute firm-specific variation ln( 2
ε σ ), as their dependent variables; while the last two columns use relative firm-specific variation, ln( 2
ε σ ) – ln( 2
m σ ), where ln( 2
m σ ) is 
absolute systematic variation. IT intensity, defined as IT capital assets (computers and software) over other capital assets, is estimated in a first stage regression 
with IT tax rates and the marginal cost of IT (quality) production as instrumental variables.  The control variables are as follows: Age is the average age of firms in 
an industry, defined as years listed in CRSP. Size is the average market capitalization or sales of the firms in each industry in the returns and sales growth 
heterogeneity regressions, respectively. The Herfindahl index is sales-based. R&D is estimated R&D capital stock over PP&E. Leverage is short plus long-term 
debt over total assets. Liquidity is current assets over current liabilities. Stock return variation is estimated using 12 monthly observations each year. Real sales 
growth variation is constructed using 12 quarterly observations over three-year rolling windows. In constructing variation measures, firms with fewer than 12 
observations are excluded. IT intensity and controls are lagged by one year for returns variation regressions, and averaged over lagged three-year windows for 
sales growth variation regressions. All regressions include time and industry fixed effects. Observations are weighted by lagged total assets in the returns variation 
regressions and average industry total assets over lagged three-year windows for sales growth variation regressions. The sample period is 1971 to 2000. The 
sample excludes IT-producing industries, finance industries (SIC 6000 to 6999), industries with fewer than 5 firms, and industries whose IT capital is ill defined. 
Numbers in parentheses are probability levels for rejecting the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient, based on t-statistics adjusted for industry clustering to eliminate 


























ln(IT) 0.411 0.334 0.355 0.307 0.191 0.151 0.381 0.117 0.291 0.194 0.182 0.202
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.432) (0.016) (0.056) (0.000) (0.010)
Corporate Demography
ln(Age) -0.274 -0.237 -0.160 -0.666 -0.618 -0.148
(0.151) (0.149) (0.122) (0.192) (0.070) (0.514)
ln(Size) -0.178 -0.164 -0.170 -0.474 -0.292 0.056
(0.041) (0.023) (0.001) (0.065) (0.072) (0.673)
Competition
Herfindahl -0.948 -0.468 1.107 -2.065 -3.984 1.295
(0.166) (0.454) (0.003) (0.006) (0.000) (0.004)
Technology
ln(1+R&D) -0.161 0.199 -1.228 -0.412 1.528 -0.421
(0.723) (0.602) (0.000) (0.688) (0.020) (0.539)
Financing
Leverage -1.335 -1.011 -0.244 -3.202 -2.236 -0.878
(0.024) (0.036) (0.400) (0.003) (0.000) (0.191)
Liquidity 0.041 0.062 0.086 -0.119 -0.314 -0.262
(0.804) (0.639) (0.155) (0.787) (0.357) (0.393)
Systematic Variation
Abs. Systematic 0.232 0.178 0.287 0.170
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Adjusted R
2
0.763 0.794 0.775 0.793 0.632 0.651 0.701 0.751 0.732 0.783 0.464 0.472
Sample size 1180 1180 1142 1142 1180 1180 990 990 911 911 990 990
Stock Returns Sales Growth 
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Table 7.  Two-Stage Panel Regressions of Firm-Specific Performance Heterogeneity on IT Intensity and Controls, 
with Time and Industry Fixed Effects, Estimated Separately for Young and Old Firm Subsamples 
Dependent variables are industry-level measures of firm-specific heterogeneity in stock returns or sales growth rates. Within each set, the first four columns have 
absolute firm-specific variation ln( 2
ε σ ), as their dependent variables; while the last two columns use relative firm-specific variation, ln( 2
ε σ ) – ln( 2
m σ ), where ln( 2
m σ ) is 
absolute systematic variation. IT intensity, defined as IT capital assets (computers and software) over other capital assets, is estimated in a first stage regression 
with IT tax rates and the marginal cost of IT (quality) production as instrumental variables.  The control variables are as follows: Age is the average age of firms in 
an industry, defined as years listed in CRSP. Size is the average market capitalization or sales of the firms in each industry in the returns and sales growth 
heterogeneity regressions, respectively. The Herfindahl index is sales-based. R&D is estimated R&D capital stock over PP&E. Leverage is short plus long-term 
debt over total assets. Liquidity is current assets over current liabilities. Stock return variation is estimated using 12 monthly observations each year. Real sales 
growth variation is constructed using 12 quarterly observations over three-year rolling windows. In constructing variation measures, firms with fewer than 12 
observations are excluded. IT intensity and controls are lagged by one year for returns variation regressions, and averaged over lagged three-year windows for 
sales growth variation regressions. All regressions include time and industry fixed effects. Observations are weighted by lagged total assets in the returns variation 
regressions and average industry total assets over lagged three-year windows for sales growth variation regressions. The sample period is 1971 to 2000. The 
sample excludes IT-producing industries, finance industries (SIC 6000 to 6999), industries with fewer than 5 firms, and industries whose IT capital is ill defined. 
Numbers in parentheses are probability levels for rejecting the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient, based on t-statistics adjusted for industry clustering to eliminate 
bias due to serial dependence within industries. Coefficients significant at 10% or better are in boldface.   
 
Panel A reports regression results for a young firm subsample, which contains firms younger than the median age of eight years as a listed firm in CRSP. Panel B 
reports regression results for an old firm subsample, which contains firms that have been listed in CRSP for eight years or more.    59


























ln(IT) 0.685 0.593 0.582 0.528 0.100 0.065 0.652 0.267 0.316 0.284 0.205 0.318
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.064) (0.136) (0.000) (0.211) (0.006) (0.156) (0.014) (0.008)
Corporate Demography
ln(Age) 0.077 0.119 -0.214 -1.089 -0.842 0.281
(0.743) (0.597) (0.081) (0.046) (0.048) (0.436)
ln(Size) -0.258 -0.210 -0.189 -0.396 -0.300 0.133
(0.055) (0.079) (0.009) (0.179) (0.199) (0.312)
Competition
Herfindahl -0.208 -0.151 0.997 3.428 2.406 0.013
(0.812) (0.859) (0.007) (0.392) (0.496) (0.994)
Technology
ln(1+R&D) -1.032 -0.167 -0.786 -0.074 1.560 0.270
(0.116) (0.761) (0.005) (0.944) (0.051) (0.760)
Financing
Leverage -0.980 -0.777 -0.472 -1.708 -0.753 -1.286
(0.084) (0.100) (0.064) (0.138) (0.417) (0.097)
Liquidity 0.239 0.235 0.019 0.346 -0.209 -0.433
(0.329) (0.294) (0.822) (0.307) (0.518) (0.157)
Systematic Variation
Abs. Systematic 0.116 0.095 0.147 0.106
(0.165) (0.147) (0.015) (0.016)
Adjusted R
2
0.605 0.649 0.602 0.628 0.528 0.540 0.675 0.709 0.690 0.709 0.388 0.383
Sample size 1055 1055 1025 1025 1055 1055 775 775 691 691 775 775
Sales Growth  Stock Returns
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ln(IT) 0.211 0.102 0.201 0.128 0.145 0.122 0.317 0.081 0.292 0.181 0.315 0.334
(0.002) (0.113) (0.000) (0.014) (0.050) (0.014) (0.049) (0.680) (0.184) (0.328) (0.007) (0.015)
Corporate Demography
ln(Age) -0.352 -0.275 0.021 -0.588 -0.522 -0.157
(0.246) (0.258) (0.853) (0.253) (0.179) (0.559)
ln(Size) -0.240 -0.248 -0.219 -0.276 -0.148 0.150
(0.028) (0.004) (0.000) (0.334) (0.572) (0.215)
Competition
Herfindahl -0.981 -0.436 1.021 -4.042 -5.928 0.249
(0.080) (0.365) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.725)
Technology
ln(1+R&D) 1.302 1.334 -0.963 -0.246 2.059 -0.046
(0.007) (0.004) (0.001) (0.834) (0.038) (0.953)
Financing
Leverage -1.070 -0.615 0.061 -3.709 -3.045 -1.328
(0.092) (0.181) (0.824) (0.020) (0.015) (0.061)
Liquidity 0.285 0.276 0.111 -0.302 -0.476 -0.282
(0.150) (0.077) (0.125) (0.509) (0.179) (0.432)
Systematic Variation
Abs. Systematic 0.313 0.226 0.162 0.088
(0.000) (0.000) (0.077) (0.143)
Adjusted R
2
0.774 0.811 0.797 0.819 0.655 0.672 0.479 0.537 0.482 0.555 0.350 0.350
Sample size 1100 1100 1066 1066 1100 1100 931 931 851 851 931 931
Stock Returns Sales Growth 
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Table 8.  Two-Stage Panel Regressions of TFP Growth on Firm-Specific 
Performance Heterogeneity and Controls, with Time and Industry Fixed Effects 
Panel data are U.S. industries followed from 1971 to 2000, across six non-overlapping five-year interval (1971-1975, 
… , 1996-2000). The dependent variable is industry TFP growth rate during each five-year interval. Initial TFP is 
measured at the beginning year at each interval. Performance heterogeneity measures are the average of values 
over the prior five-year interval, (t-9, t-5). All regressions include time and industry fixed effects. Observations are 
weighted by the industry’s total assets, averaged over the prior window. The sample excludes IT-producing industries, 
finance industries (SIC 6000 to 6999), and industries with fewer than 5 firms available for constructing TFP growth 
rates or performance heterogeneity measures, as well industries whose IT capital is ill defined. Columns 8.1 and 8.2 
use BEA industry-level TFP data while columns 8.3 and 8.4 use TFP measures constructed from Compustat sample 
firms. All columns report 2SLS regressions results where IT taxes and marginal cost of IT (quality) production are 
used as instruments. Numbers in parentheses are probability levels, based on t-statistics adjusted for industry 
clustering. Coefficients significant at 10% or better are in boldface.  
 
  TFP growth defined using 
BEA industry-level data    TFP growth defined using 
Compustat sample firms
  8.1 8.2    8.3  8.4 
Performance Heterogeneity          
0.299     1.130    Absolute firm-specific return variation, ln(
2
ε σ ) 
(0.098)     (0.000)   
-0.206    -0.822    Absolute systematic returns variation, ln(
2
m σ ) 
(0.340)     (0.012)   





 (0.033)      (0.000) 
Controls          
-0.180 -0.174   -0.391  -0.340  Initial ln(TFP) 
(0.288) (0.280)    (0.000)  (0.000) 
Adjusted R
2   0.623 0.613    0.749  0.715 
Sample size  190  190  190  190 
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Table 9.  Panel Regressions of Turnover Measure on Information Technology 
Intensity and Controls with Time and Industry Fixed Effects 
The dependent variable is turnover rate based on market value, operating income, and sales. Turnover rate is the 
probability of a firm dropping out of the industry’s top quintile within five years, as defined in Comin and Philippon 
(2005). All regressions include time and industry fixed effects. Observations are weighted by lagged total asset. The 
sample period is 1971 to 2000. The sample also excludes IT-producing industries, finance industries (SIC 6000 to 
6999), industries with fewer than 5 firms, and industries whose IT capital is ill defined. Intercept estimates are not 
reported. Numbers in parentheses are probability levels, based on t-statistics adjusted for industry clustering to 
eliminate bias due to serial dependence within industries, at which the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient can be 
rejected. Coefficients significant at 10% or better are in boldface.  
 
   Market Value     Operating Income     Sales 
   9.1  9.2    9.3  9.4    9.5  9.6 
Information 
Technology              
ln(IT)  0.029 0.051    0.032 0.036    0.021 0.035 
  (0.033)  (0.009)  (0.000)  (0.040)  (0.012)  (0.009) 
Corporate 
Demography               
ln(Age)  0.035 0.046    -0.053  -0.051    0.076 0.083 
  (0.593)  (0.481)  (0.231)  (0.278)  (0.041)  (0.026) 
ln(Size)  -0.099 -0.101    -0.057 -0.057    -0.129 -0.124 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Competition               
Herfindahl  -0.077 -0.110    0.022  0.016  -0.076  -0.104 
  (0.690)  (0.541)  (0.871)  (0.910)  (0.496)  (0.387) 
Technology               
ln(1+R&D)  -0.230  -0.262  -0.011  -0.017  -0.104  -0.120 
  (0.151)  (0.119)  (0.938)  (0.914)  (0.621)  (0.581) 
Financing               
Leverage  -0.020  0.005  0.119  0.124    0.178 0.194 
  (0.920)  (0.981)  (0.466)  (0.466)  (0.056)  (0.038) 
Liquidity  -0.045  -0.063  -0.025  -0.028  0.007  -0.005 
  (0.493)  (0.378)  (0.291)  (0.313)    (0.830)  (0.891) 
Adjusted R
2  0.535  0.514    0.647  0.634  0.714  0.700 
Sample size  1180  1180     1180  1180     1010  1010 
   
 
 